

# BATTLEFIELD: PLAY4FREE

## ARGUMENTS INJECTION

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**Abstract** *This paper describes a remote code execution vulnerability in Battlefield Play4Free<sup>3</sup>. The vulnerability was first presented by the authors at Black Hat Europe 2013<sup>4</sup>, as part of a talk covering several interesting aspects related to games security.*

### 1 SOFTWARE DESCRIPTION

From Wikipedia<sup>5</sup>: "Battlefield Play4Free (sometimes abbreviated BF: P4F) is a first-person shooter video game developed by EA Digital Illusions CE and Easy Studios and published by EA. Based on the Battlefield series, the game features a modern warfare battlefield setting. Play4Free is built on a modified version of Battlefield 2's game engine with improvements such as high resolution artwork and post-processing effects. The game is also less demanding on computer specifications, similar to Battlefield Heroes.



Figure 1: Battlefield Play4Free

As the game's title suggests, the game is available to players for free online, under Electronic Arts' "Play4Free" model. Play4Free uses a similar micro-transaction store system similar to that in Battlefield Heroes."

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<sup>2</sup><http://twitter.com/dntbug>

<sup>3</sup><http://battlefield.play4free.com>

<sup>4</sup><http://www.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings.html#Ferrante>

<sup>5</sup>[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battlefield\\_Play4Free](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battlefield_Play4Free)

## 2 VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION

Battlefield Play4Free is based on the Frostbite<sup>6</sup> game engine and it shares the same architecture with Battlefield Heroes<sup>7</sup>. The game architecture will be described first, in order to get a better understanding of the issues affecting the game.

### 2.1 GAME ARCHITECTURE

An overview of the game architecture is shown in the following image:




Figure 2: Battlefield Play4Free architecture

The interaction among these three components is the following:

- The *Browser Plugin* exports the following method to the *browsers*, so any website can call these functions:
  - `Start( bstrCmdLine, bstrDotnetfxUrl );`
- When `Start` is called the *Game Plugin* executes the following code:
  - `CreateProcessW("B*Updater.exe %bstrCmdLine% -host %website%");`
- `%website%`, the website calling the `Start` function, is checked against a whitelist<sup>8</sup> by the *Game Updater* component.
  - Only websites in the whitelist can use the *Game* component
- The *Game Updater* checks the game version and executes the *Game* by using a command line, which may contain the following arguments:
  - `dc, lang, sessionId, soldierName`

Please note that the arguments are passed from the *Game Plugin* as is to the *Game* component. Most interestingly, the Battlefield Play4Free `soldierName` argument can be abused.

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<sup>6</sup><http://dice.se/frostbite/>

<sup>7</sup><http://www.battlefieldheroes.com>

<sup>8</sup>See *Appendix A* for details

## 2.2 CREATEPROCESSW AND HOST WHITELIST BYPASS

The *Game Updater* component performs a whitelist check for security reasons, to prevent games running from malicious (non whitelisted) hosts. The following image gives an idea of how the *command line* is handled by the game:




Figure 3: The whitelist check in action

The vulnerability is exploitable only on *Windows XP an 2003*, due to the way the *CreateProcessW* API works for these versions. The *CreateProcess* function is defined as follows:

```

BOOL WINAPI CreateProcess (
    _In_opt_ LPCTSTR lpApplicationName ,
    _Inout_opt_ LPTSTR lpCommandLine ,
    _In_opt_ LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpProcessAttributes ,
    _In_opt_ LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes ,
    _In_ BOOL bInheritHandles ,
    _In_ DWORD dwCreationFlags ,
    _In_opt_ LPVOID lpEnvironment ,
    _In_opt_ LPCTSTR lpCurrentDirectory ,
    _In_ LPSTARTUPINFO lpStartupInfo ,
    _Out_ LPPROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation
);
    
```

Consider function parameter *LPTSTR lpCommandLine*. The *CreateProcessW* (not *CreateProcessA*) function handles this parameter differently depending on the version of Windows in use on the system. Specifically, prior to Windows Vista, if *lpCommandLine* is longer than 32kb, *CreateProcessW* truncates *lpCommandLine* to 32kb, and executes the command. For Windows Vista and later versions, it terminates. The following image shows a tricky way to bypass the whitelist check:




Figure 4: Bypass the whitelist check by padding out the real host

## 2.3 TARGETING WINDOWS XP

*Battlefield Play4Free* has been available since 2011, and it requires *DirectX 9* in order to run. The game uses a low amount of system resources and it is used on Windows XP systems too. Issues affecting Windows XP are still valuable. As of March 2013, Windows XP has about 40% of the market share<sup>9</sup>.

## 2.4 THE ROOT CAUSE

The game allows us to exploit the *soldierName* argument as the *Game Updater* supports the char " (*double quote*), while the *Game* component doesn't. Because of that it is possible for an attacker to inject arbitrary sequences of "arguments". The following image shows the problem by detailing how each component handles a given command line string (*bstrCmdLine*):




Figure 5: Components handling bad arguments

It's interesting to note that *Battlefield Heroes* is not affected by this issue, since its *Game Updater* component doesn't support the double quotes for *soldierName* option. Please keep in mind that this vulnerability is limited to Windows XP, due to the way the *Browser Plugin* spawns the process using *CreateProcessW*.

## 2.5 POSSIBLE ATTACK PLAN

To exploit the vulnerability, the *+modPath* option was used to specify a directory containing game mod data (sounds, map, etc.). Mod data is usually composed of *ZIP files* and *CON files* to configure the Frostbite game engine. Interestingly, the *+modPath* option can refer to arbitrary paths, which may include SMB/WebDAV locations. In general the *+modPath* option is used to load files, such as *RankSettings.con*. Consider the idea to craft a *RankSettings.con* file, to invoke the following commands on the game engine:

- *sound.addSound*
- *ObjectTemplate.soundFilename*
- *sound.listSoundsToFile*

To make the attack more stealthy an attacker can add *Game.crash* to the sequence of commands above. This will cause the program to terminate just after executing all the commands.

<sup>9</sup>[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft\\_Windows#Usage\\_share](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Windows#Usage_share)

## 2.6 +MODPATH EXPLOITATION: STEP 1

This section describes the approach used to demonstrate the vulnerability. The following sequence of commands were used:

- *sound.addSound*
  - specifies the name of the sound resource
- *ObjectTemplate.soundFilename*
  - used for commands, note:
    - \* the double quote char (") cannot be used and no escape char is available
    - \* the comma char (,) is used to delimit file names, for example, "hello, world" is split in 2 lines with the comma removed
    - \* each line will be converted to lowercase
    - \* each line must be unique, and duplicates are discarded
    - \* each line generated is followed by the string:  
;0.000000;0.000000;0;0.000000;0;0;UNKNOWN
    - \* all backslashes will be converted to forward slashes
    - \* each line can be a maximum of 1024 bytes due to a *sprintf\_s*
    - \* the usage of % is limited due to a format string bug
- *sound.listSoundsToFile*
  - stores the commands in a file

## 2.7 +MODPATH EXPLOITATION: STEP 2

It's important to keep in mind the following limitations:

- *UNC* paths are excluded because backslashes are converted to forward slashes
- *ftp.exe*
  - doesn't support passive mode, and the non-passive mode will trigger the firewall
- *vbs*
  - *soundFilename* limitations make its usage very difficult, although a good option for a *download&execute* approach
- *telnet -f*
  - limited to text data
- *rundll*
  - comma not allowed
- *webdav*

- available from XP to Windows 8 except for 2003 (disabled), as a manual or automatic service<sup>10</sup>.
- *tftp.exe*
  - available by default on Windows XP, it works on udp, and it's not limited by the firewall

## 2.8 +MODPATH EXPLOITATION: STEP 3

To demonstrate the vulnerability, *tftp.exe* was used. This is probably the best choice since only Windows XP and 2003 are affected by the vulnerability. The following describes how to bypass the limitations:

- use `&&` in the batch file to avoid handling the string `";0.000000;0.000000;0;0.000000;0;0;UNKNOWN"`:
- use `%%` instead of `%` to avoid the format string vulnerability:
- the `%TEMP%` folder was chosen because Windows XP uses 8.3 expansion, alternatively fixed paths could be used, such as: `c:\windows\temp`, etc.

The proof of concept video provides several additional details on how an attacker may exploit this issue.

## 3 PROOF OF CONCEPT

A proof of concept video<sup>11</sup> showing how to spawn a reverse shell is available on our Vimeo channel<sup>12</sup>. The video shows all steps described in this paper.

## 4 APPENDIX A: WHITELIST

The following are the whitelisted domains, for the *host check* performed by the game:

- 159.153.184.131
- dice-mdraper1.dice.ad.ea.com
- dice-jtarnstro1.dice.ad.ea.com
- easy-bfh-dev-trunk
- easy-bfh-test-trunk
- easy-bfh-test-release
- preprod.battlefield.play4free.com
- battlefield.play4free.com
- pte.battlefield.play4free.com
- preprod.battlefield.play4free.com

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<sup>10</sup><http://batcmd.com/windows/xp/services/webclient/>

<sup>11</sup><http://vimeo.com/61364094>

<sup>12</sup><http://vimeo.com/revuln>

## 5 FAQ

The following FAQ provides additional information about the issue described in this paper.

- Is this issue exploitable only on Windows XP systems?
  - Yes, XP and 2003.
- What are the affected versions of the components?
  - *Plugin* component version *1.0.80.2*, and *Game* component *1.52.245751.0*
- I can't reproduce the issue, why?
  - Because EA, after our paper, fixed on *25 March 2013* the issue with a new release of the *Plugin* component, version *1.0.95.0*

## 6 REVISION HISTORY

- 25 March 2013: Version 1.1 released, FAQ section added.
- 22 March 2013: Version 1.0 released.